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Abstract
We use a panel VAR to assess the dynamic e¤ects of government spending on unemploy-
ment rates in OECD countries. We rst present Monte Carlo evidence that the Hahn and
Kuersteiner (2002) estimator produces almost unbiased estimates of impulse responses in
an annual macro panel VAR. In the application, we nd that positive shocks to govern-
ment spending identied either through a Cholesky decomposition or by sign restrictions
tend to lower the unemployment rate in the short run, though signicance depends on
identication assumptions.
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1 Introduction
VAR studies on the e¤ects of scal spending shocks often focus on a limited set of coun-
tries for which quarterly scal data are available. Annual data are available for many
more countries, but the resulting short sample sizes require panel techniques. While the
traditional xed e¤ects estimator is known to su¤er from potential bias in dynamic panel
models (Nickell, 1981), available alternatives are rarely used in panel VAR studies and
their properties in the context of macro applications with the typical T > N situation
(time dimension larger than cross section) is largely unexplored.4
This paper contributes as follows. We estimate the e¤ects of government spending in
an annual panel VAR of 18 OECD countries from 1970 to 2008 using a bias-corrected
xed-e¤ects estimator due to Hahn and Kuersteiner (2002). We conduct a brief Monte
Carlo study to check the performance of this estimator and nd that it produces almost
unbiased estimates of the impulse response functions (arguably the relevant performance
measure for applied work).
We use the estimator to provide estimates on an empirical question which is highly
relevant for policy issues: do increases in government spending lower the unemployment
rate? In previous work, Monacelli et al. (2010) have found a decreasing e¤ect for the US,
whereas Brückner and Pappa (2011) nd that higher government spending generally raises
unemployment in the countries where quarterly scal variables are available5, although
possibly decreasing it in the US when pre-1960s sample information is used. Using an
annual panel data set, we provide evidence on the average unemployment response in a
much wider range of countries.
Our main result is that we generally nd evidence of decreasing unemployment rates
in response to increases in scal spending in the short run and some evidence of rising
unemployment over the longer run; whether the initial unemployment decline is signicant
or not depends on the identifying assumptions (discussed below).
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces data, model specication,
and discusses identication. In Section 3, we investigate the properties of the estimator
employed. The empirical results are presented in Section 4. The last section concludes.
2 Data and specication
Our baseline specication uses annual observations on the 18 OECD countries for which
the required scal variables are available. The time period is 1970-2008. We use a panel
VAR with two lags (controlling for xed e¤ects and time-specic e¤ects) in real government
consumption gt, real GDP yt, real private consumption ct, tax revenues relative to GDP
 t, the nominal government bond interest rate rt, the rate of ination of the GDP deator
t, government debt as a fraction of GDP dt, and the unemployment rate ut. The spending
4Monte Carlo evidence is provided by e.g. Judson and Owen (1999).
5Their main results pertain to Australia, Canada, Japan, the UK and the US.
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variables are expressed in logarithmic per capita terms and are detrended using a linear
country-specic trend as in Beetsma et al. (2006, 2008), while the rates enter linearly.
Data sources, variable denitions and a list of countries included in the analysis can be
found in a web appendix.6 When we drop rt and  t from the VAR, the set of countries
can be extended to 22; we checked that the results with respect to the impulse response
of unemployment are very similar for this specication (results are available on request).
The standard identifying restriction in the quarterly VAR literature (Blanchard and
Perotti, 2002, Perotti, 2007) is that government spending is predetermined within a period
due to implementation lags, and can therefore be ordered rst in a recursive identica-
tion. This might be seen as less compelling in annual data.7 Therefore, we also report
evidence where the standard predeterminedness assumption is not imposed, but instead
sign restrictions are used to identify scal shocks, as in Canova and Pappa (2007), Pappa
(2009), or Mountford and Uhlig (2009).
3 Econometric issues
Using annual instead of quarterly data has the obvious drawback that the number of
time periods is relatively small. The standard xed e¤ects estimator is known to su¤er
from a negative bias in dynamic models when T is small, see Nickell (1981). We take
serious potential estimation biases in the panel VAR and use a bias-corrected version of
the simple xed e¤ects estimator developed by Hahn and Kuersteiner (2002). To check
how successful this estimator is in coping with the Nickell-bias in panel VARs having the
dimension of the dataset at hand, we conduct a brief Monte Carlo study that complements
previous simulation studies in several ways. First, we consider the practically relevant case
of several lags and several equations in the panel VAR with T > N (8 equations, 2 lags,
18 countries, 38 years).8 Second, we assess the performance of the estimator in terms of
the implied impulse responses, which are the objects of interest for applied VAR studies.
Our simulation setup follows Binder et al. (2005) and is described in more detail in the
web appendix. There, we also describe how the Hahn and Kuersteiner (2002) estimator
can be implemented for models with higher order VAR dynamics by imposing blockwise
zero and identity restrictions on the slope coe¢ cients. Our Monte Carlo study shows
that the Hahn and Kuersteiner (2002) estimator provides almost unbiased estimates of
6http://www.wiso.tu-dortmund.de/wiso/mak/Medienpool/de/prole/Pub-MAK-FAJU/index.html
7However, the issue is largely unsettled: rst, Beetsma et al. (2009) as well as Born and Müller (2012)
argue that this problem seems empirically negligible when comparing results from VARs on countries where
both quarterly and annual data are available. Second, Beetsma et al. (2006, 2008) point out that budget
decisions are taken mostly once a year, such that annual data provide a more natural interpretation of
estimated scal shocks. Third, Ramey (2011) argues that annual data mitigate the potential problem of
anticipation of scal policy changes.
8Binder et al. (2005) also provide Monte Carlo evidence for panel VAR estimators, but do not consider
bias-corrected xed e¤ects techniques due to their focus on short panels with T = 3 or 10 and N being
large. Moreover, they restrict their attention to a two-variable rst-order VAR. Judson and Owen (1999)
consider long panels but focus on single-equation models with one lag.
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the impulse responses and is therefore most suitable for our analysis of scal shocks, see
Figure 1 in the web appendix.
4 Results
Figure 1 displays the impulse responses (with bootstrapped 90% condence bands) to a
one standard deviation shock to government spending for the baseline specication with
government spending ordered rst in a recursive identication.
Figure 1: Impulse responses to a one standard deviation shock to government spending
(recursive identication assuming government spending ordered rst)
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The gure shows a hump-shaped decline in the unemployment rate in response to an
increase in government consumption. Output and private consumption react positively,
as expected from previous studies. The other responses appear mostly insignicant, the
exception being ination which shows a temporary decline. The peak of the unemployment
decline is reached two years after the shock. To assess the quantitative impact (note that
government spending is in logs, while the unemployment rate is linear and a decimal
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Figure 2: Impulse response functions obtained using sign restrictions
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number), we evaluate the decline at the overall sample mean of the ratio of government
spending to GDP of 0:2076. An unexpected increase in government spending of 1% of
GDP translates into a maximum decrease in the unemployment rate of roughly half a
percentage point. This estimate is smaller but in the same range as the one reported by
Monacelli et al. (2010) obtained using quarterly US data.
These results are based on the identifying assumption that government spending does
not endogenously react to other variables within a period, which might be overly restrictive
in annual data. Figure 2 therefore, as a robustness check, provides impulse responses based
on an alternative identication that does not impose recursivity assumptions, but uses sign
restrictions (see Fry and Pagan, 2011, for a review).
We identify a government spending shock as in Canova and Pappa (2007) or Pappa
(2009) by imposing the sign restrictions that it should raise government spending, gov-
ernment debt, and output on impact. These restrictions are in line with most general
equilibrium models of scal policy, as these imply a positive response of spending and
5
Figure 3: Impulse response functions to a one standard deviation shock in government
spending (recursive identication assuming government spending ordered rst).
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output in the short run (e.g. Pappa, 2009), and we assume that there are no balanced-
budget spending shocks, such that government debt temporarily increases.9
As can be seen from Figure 2, the median responses under sign restrictions to a one
standard deviation government spending shock are qualitatively similar to the ones ob-
tained under the recursive identication. Most importantly, we again nd a temporary
decrease in the unemployment rate. To illustrate the magnitude of the spread of the re-
sponses, the dashed lines show the 16th and 84th percentiles of the accepted responses.10
These bands are very wide, however, so that the response appears altogether insignicant.
Brückner and Pappa (2011) found mostly positive or inconclusive unemployment re-
sponses in Australia, Canada, Japan, the UK, and the US. If we include only these coun-
tries in our sample, the unemployment response (shown in panel (a) of Figure 3) is initially
almost at, before turning positive later.11 Thus, the negative short-run e¤ect that we
nd in the whole sample is driven by the other countries in our sample. As Brückner and
Pappa (2011) also nd di¤erences with respect to the sample period, we reestimate the
model for the full sample starting only in 1980. In this specication, the unemployment
response is initially still negative, though smaller than for the longer sample, and possibly
turns positive after a few years, see panel (b) of Figure 3. Taken together, the results
suggest that the e¤ect of higher government spending seems to be slightly negative or neg-
ligible in the short-run, with some indication that there may be a delayed positive e¤ect;
we do not nd evidence of marked increases in unemployment after a spending shock.
9 In addition, to rule out some implausible responses, we restrict the short-run scal multiplier, i.e.
the percentage output response to a scal shock of size one percent of GDP, to be less than three, as
universally found in the scal VAR literature (e.g. Perotti, 2007).
10These intervals do not take into account the estimation uncertainty in the reduced-form coe¢ cients.
11The responses in Figure 3 are based on the recursive ordering. Medians of the sign restricted model
responses convey the same message.
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5 Conclusion
We have used a bias-corrected panel VAR estimator due to Hahn and Kuersteiner (2002)
to assess the dynamic e¤ects of government spending on unemployment rates in OECD
countries. A Monte Carlo study has shown that the estimator performs well in the situation
at hand, which suggests that it should be viewed as a useful tool for typical macro panel
VARs with relatively large time and small cross-sectional dimensions. We have found that
positive shocks to government spending (identied either in a recursive way or through sign
restrictions) seem to lower the unemployment rate in the short-run, though signicance
depends on the identication assumptions as well as on details with respect to the set of
included countries and the sample length.
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